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PILING ON DEBT: 
The Intersections Between Child Support 
Arrears and Legal Financial Obligations
Vicki Turetsky and Maureen R. Waller
Abstract
Child support is one of many debts that accumulate for poor non-
resident parents during and after incarceration.  As with legal financial 
obligations, child support debt functions as a form of cost recovery to the 
state, includes other fees, costs, and interest added onto the original child 
support order, and triggers aggressive enforcement measures.  This Arti-
cle focuses on child support policies that contribute to the debt burden 
held by the most disadvantaged parents, who are more likely to have con-
tact with the criminal justice system and a history of incarceration.   The 
Article first addresses cost recovery by the child support program and 
then discusses child support debt as a collateral consequence of incarcer-
ation.   The Article also points to key factors driving this debt, including 
support orders that are not based on ability to pay, and identifies enforce-
ment strategies that can further reduce nonresident parents’ ability to 
pay these debts, such as incarceration and driver’s license suspension.  We 
identify recent policy efforts that address the causes and consequences 
of accruing unmanageable debt, including during periods of incarcera-
tion.  The Article concludes with policy recommendations which would 
prioritize children’s wellbeing over cost recovery and help disadvantaged 
parents make consistent child support payments, participate in the job 
market, and maintain family relationships.
About the Authors
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during the Obama administration.  Maureen R. Waller is Associate Pro-
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Introduction
It is unconstitutional to incarcerate people for debts they are un-
able to pay.  In Turner v. Rogers, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that 
indigent nonresident parents owing child support arrears may not be sent 
to jail without determining whether they had the ability to pay their child 
support arrears.2  However, there is no legal protection against incurring 
unmanageable debts during incarceration.  More than half of people in-
carcerated in state prison are parents of minor children and half of these 
parents have open child support cases.3  In prison, child support debt can 
continue to build month by month, often growing exponentially during 
this time.4  Research suggests parents typically enter prison with  $10,000 
in child support arrears and leave owing $20,000 or more.5
2. The resident (or custodial) parent is the parent who lives with the child the ma-
jority of the time.  The nonresident (or noncustodial) parent is the parent who 
does not live with the child the majority of the time.  An obligor is a nonresident 
parent with a child support order.  See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011).
3. Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, Bureau of Justice Statistics Spe-
cial Report: Parents in Prison and Their Minor Children 17 (2010); Ctr. for 
Pol’y Res., Incarceration, Reentry and Child Support Issues: National and 
State Research Overview 2–4 (2006).
4. Jessica Pearson, Building Debt While Doing Time: Child Support and Incarcera-
tion, 43 Judges J. 5, 7 (2004).
5. Several early state studies found that incarcerated parents leave prison with an 
average of $15,000 to $30,000 or more in unpaid child support, with no means to 
pay upon release.  See Vicki Turetsky, Staying in Jobs and Out of the Under-
ground: Child Support Policies that Encourage Legitimate Work 2 (2007); 
Esther Griswold & Jessica Pearson, Twelve Reasons for Collaboration Between 
Departments of Correction and Child Support Enforcement Agencies, 65 Cor-
rections Today  87, 87–88 (2003).
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Child support is just one of many debts that accumulate for non-
resident parents during and after incarceration.  As with legal financial 
obligations, child support debt can function as a form of cost recovery to 
the state, include other fees, costs, and interest added onto the original 
child support order, and trigger aggressive enforcement measures.  Par-
ents who have contact with the criminal justice system can also incur a 
long list of additional legal financial obligations, including fines, restitu-
tion, fees, and assessments.6  We have limited information about the total 
magnitude of these financial obligations across the two systems or the 
cumulative consequences for low-income parents and their families as 
they accrue over time.
There are several parallels between monetary sanctions imposed by 
the criminal justice and those imposed by the child support system as well 
as notable differences.  Legally, child support is not a fine that represents 
a punishment, sanction, or a penalty or a form of restitution to compen-
sate victims for damages.7  Instead, it reflects the basic legal obligation of 
parents to support their children.  Similar to fees, costs, and surcharges, 
however, child support can function as a form of cost recovery to the 
state.  Under welfare cost recovery policies, states confiscate child sup-
port payments from the poorest families to reimburse public assistance 
and fund government operations.8  When child support is retained as 
state revenue, it is similar to legal financial obligations, and enforcement 
efforts to recoup welfare costs “more closely resemble debt-collection 
proceedings,” according to the Turner Court.9
As with legal financial obligations, child support arrears often in-
clude other fees, costs, and interest added onto the original child support 
order.  Indeed, interest has been identified as the most important factor 
driving the significant growth arrears in several states.10  Child support 
arrears can also include retroactive support for periods before the orders 
were established, including Medicaid costs for the birth.11  Like finan-
6. See, e.g., Karin D. Martin et al., Monetary Sanctions: Legal Financial Obliga-
tions in US Systems of Justice, 1 Ann. Rev. Crim. 471, 475 (2018); Mary Fainsod 
Katzenstein & Maureen R. Waller, Taxing the Poor: Incarceration, Poverty Gov-
ernance, and the Seizure of Family Resources, 13 Persp. Pol. 638, 639 (2015); 
Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ Accumu-
lation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. & 
Pol’y 187, 188–89 (2007).
7. Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for 
the Poor 18 (2016).
8. See Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Maureen R. Waller, Taxing the Poor: Incarcer-
ation, Poverty Governance, and the Seizure of Family Resources, 13 Persp. Pol. 
638, 645 (2015); Vicki Turetsky, What If All the Money Came Home? 1 (2000).
9. Turner v. Rogers, supra note 2, at 449.
10. Elaine Sorensen, Liliana Sousa, & Simone G. Schaner, Assessing Child Sup-
port Arrears in Nine Large States and the Nation 55 (2007).
11. See Carolyn J. Heinrich, Brett C. Burkhardt, & Hilary M. Shager, Reducing Child 
Support Debt and Its Consequences: Can Forgiveness Benefit All?, 30 J. Pol’y 
Analysis & Mgmt. 755, 756 (2011).
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cial obligations accrued in the criminal justice system, this type of debt 
similarly accumulates over time and can trigger aggressive enforcement 
measures such as incarceration and driver’s license suspension.12
Nonresident parents with the lowest incomes and most barriers to 
employment are often expected to pay an impossibly large share of their 
income toward child support.13  When support orders fail to take into ac-
count the real financial capacity of parents, debt builds rapidly over time. 
Unpaid child support contributes to an overwhelming debt burden held 
by incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people in particular, who are 
generally poor and disproportionately people of color.14
For the most part, this debt will never be collected.15  Outstanding 
child support arrears have grown to $115 billion over the last forty years,16 
and most of this debt is owed by parents with incomes under $10,000.17 
When parents fall behind, poorly targeted and overly aggressive enforce-
ment can make it even harder for them to stay employed, maintain family 
ties, and keep up with their support payments.18  Unrealistic child support 
orders, cost recovery policies, and harsh enforcement efforts may also 
undermine parents’ trust in the legitimacy of the child support system.19
Faced with overwhelming financial pressures, some parents try to 
ignore their unmanageable child support obligations, pay only a portion 
of their debt, or work in the informal economy where it is difficult to track 
earnings and collect payments.  Others may generate income through il-
legal activities to support their children and themselves and to pay down 
12. In fact, several of the enforcement tools currently used to collect legal financial 
obligations were derived from the child support program.  See Paul K. Legler, 
The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Wel-
fare Act, 30 Fam. L. Q. 519 (1996).
13. Carl Formoso, Determining the Composition and Collectibility of Child 
Support Arrearages Volume I: The Longitudinal Analysis 1–2 (2003).
14. Jennifer Bronson & E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2017 15 (2019); Caroline W. 
Harlow, Educ. & Correctional Populations 6–10 (2003).
15. See Robert Plotnick et al., Increasing Child Support Collections from the Hard-
to-Collect: Experimental Evidence from Washington State, 89 Soc. Serv. Rev. 427, 
428 (2015); Sorensen, Sousa & Schaner, supra note 10, at 55; Formoso, supra 
note 13, at 27.
16. This amount refers to total federally-certified arrears owed by parents partici-
pating in the public child support program funded under title IV-D of the So-
cial Security Act and does not include arrears owed in private cases.  Elaine 
Sorensen, TANF Arrears Continue to Decline, Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2019.
17. Sorensen, Sousa & Schaner, supra note 10, at 22.
18. Kimberly J. Turner & Maureen R. Waller, Indebted Relationships: Child Support 
Arrears and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Children, 79 J. of Marriage 
& Fam. 24, 25 (2017); Daniel P. Miller & Ronald B. Mincy, Falling Further Behind? 
Child Support Arrears and Fathers’ Labor Force Participation, 86 Soc. Serv. Rev. 
604, 604–05 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Turetsky, supra note 5, at 3; Maureen R. Waller & Robert Plotnick, Ef-
fective Child Support Policy for Low-Income Families: Evidence from Street Lev-
el Research, 20 J. of Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 89, 107 (2001).
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their debts.20  Unmanageable child support debt negatively impacts 
family and community stability and contributes to accumulating risks, 
disadvantages, and inequities for children, parents, and communities.21
This article focuses on child support policies that contribute to the 
debt burden held by the most disadvantaged parents, who are more likely 
to have contact with the criminal justice system and a history of incar-
ceration.  The article first addresses cost recovery by the child support 
program and then discusses child support debt as a collateral conse-
quence of incarceration.  The article also points to key factors driving this 
debt, including support orders that are not based on ability to pay, and 
identifies enforcement measures that can further reduce nonresident par-
ents’ ability to pay these debts, such as incarceration and driver’s license 
suspension.  We identify recent policy efforts that address the causes and 
consequences of accruing unmanageable child support arrears, includ-
ing during periods of incarceration.  The Article concludes with policy 
recommendations which would prioritize children’s wellbeing over cost 
recovery and help disadvantaged parents make consistent child support 
payments, participate in the job market, and maintain family relationships.
I. Cost Recovery in the Child Support Program
The child support program serves one in five children in the United 
States and half of poor children, making child support one of the larg-
est income support programs for children.  The program collected $28.6 
billion in 2018, making child support one of the largest income support 
programs for children.22  Resident parents who apply for Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF) are required to participate in the 
state child support program and assign their rights to support to the 
state.23  Parents may also be subject to state cost recovery efforts if their 
children receive Medicaid or foster care payments.  Other families volun-
tarily apply for child support services.24
20. Turetsky, supra note 5; Lauren J. Kotloff, Leaving the Street: Young Fa-
thers Move from Hustling to Legitimate Work, Public/Private Ventures 5–8 
(2005); Lauren M. Rich, Regular and Irregular Earnings: Implications for Child 
Support Practices, 23 Child. & Youth Serv. Rev. 353, 354–55 (2001).
21. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: 
Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 Am. J. 
of Soc. 1753, 1760–61 (2010); Ronald B. Mincy & Elaine J. Sorensen, Deadbeats 
and Turnips in Child Support Reform, 17 J. of Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 44, 44–45 
(1998).
22. In 2018, 9 percent of the child support program caseload involved families re-
ceiving TANF, while 42 percent involved former TANF families who did not opt 
out of services when they stopped receiving TANF.  Half of families never re-
ceived TANF. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, supra note 16, at 7–8.
23. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
24. In most states, parents of children receiving Medicaid are required to cooper-
ate with the child support program and assign their rights to the state to medi-
cal support payments specifically designated for medical expenses and ordered 
separately from monthly child support obligations.  See Social Security Act, 42 
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Not all families with child support cases participate in the child 
support program; some pursue child support through private litigation. 
Parents who participate in the public program tend to be more econom-
ically disadvantaged than parents with private cases, and are more likely 
to be people of color.25  Over half of resident parents participating in 
the public child support program are Black or Hispanic, two-thirds have 
incomes below 200 percent of poverty, and over three-quarters receive 
some form of public assistance.26
Child support enforcement tools have been particularly effective 
for parents who have stable connections to employment and the financial 
ability to meet their child support obligations.27  Most nonresident par-
ents pay child support, and consistent, on-time child support payments 
can help low-income families increase their income and improve their 
economic stability.28  Child support represents a 41 percent share of fam-
ily income for poor families that receive it, and lifts 1 million people out 
of poverty every year.29
However, estimates indicate that about one-quarter of nonresident 
parents are poor and unable to meet their formal child support obliga-
tions.30  This is usually because child support orders for these parents do 
not adequately account for actual income and are set at unrealistical-
ly high levels.  Despite barriers to meeting their formal child support 
obligations, the majority of low-income fathers provide in-kind or infor-
mal support to their young children, and informal support is associated 
with spending more time with children and closeness in the father-child 
U.S.C. § 1396k (2020).  In addition, states are required to refer “appropriate” fos-
ter care cases to the child support program and require assignment when chil-
dren receive federally funded maintenance payments.  42 U.S.C. §  671(a)(17) 
(2020); see also Information Memorandum IM-12-02 from Vicki Turetsky, Com-
missioner, Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv. to 
State Agencies Administering Child Support Enf’t Plans under Title IV-B, IV-D, 
and IV-E of the Social Security Act (Aug. 1, 2012).
25. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, supra note 16, at 7.
26. Natalie Demyan & Letitia Logan Passarella, Lifting Families Out of Pov-
erty: Child Support is an Effective Tool for Maryland Families 1 (2019); 
Elaine Sorensen, Arthur Pashi & Melody Morales,  Characteristics of Fam-
ilies Served by the Child Support (IV-D) Program: 2016 U.S. Census Survey 
Results 4–9 (2018).
27. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Family Cen-
tered Innovations to Improve Child Support Outcomes 2 (2011).
28. Demyan & Passarella, supra note 26, at 5; Elaine Sorensen, The Child Sup-
port Program is a Good Investment 10 (2016); Yoonsook Ha, Maria Cancian 
& Daniel R. Meyer, The Regularity of Child Support and Its Contribution to the 
Regularity of Income, 85 Soc. Serv. Rev. 401, 402–03 (2011).
29. Elaine Sorensen, The Child Support Program is a Good Investment 2 (2016).
30. Elaine Sorensen & Helen Oliver, Policy Reforms are Needed to Increase 
Child Support from Poor Fathers 3–4 (2002); see also Yoonsook Ha, Maria 
Cancian & Daniel R. Meyer, Child Support and Income Inequality, 10 Poverty 
& Pub. Pol’y 147, 153 (2018) (suggesting that the incomes of unmarried fathers 
are equal to or less than unmarried mothers after paying child support).
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relationship.31  Poor mothers and fathers often report a preference for 
informal support when the father’s child support payment is retained to 
recover welfare costs.32
Most child support payments collected by the child support pro-
gram are used to support children.  However, the child support program, 
which is funded by federal and state governments, also has a significant 
cost recovery function.  This means that many of the poorest children 
never receive the child support paid by their parents.  Welfare cost recov-
ery policies embedded in the child support program alter the stakes and 
equities of child support enforcement.  When child support payments are 
used as government revenues, they lose their character as support for 
children and more closely resemble legal financial obligations used to 
finance government functions.33
Families who apply for TANF must assign, or sign over, to the state 
their rights to child support in order to receive cash assistance.  States 
hold back $1.1 billion, or 4 percent of total program collections, to re-
imburse cash assistance from TANF and foster care programs.34  Those 
collections are split with the federal government and treated as govern-
ment revenues.  Typically, the state share is used to fund TANF, child 
support, or other social services, or is added to the state general fund, 
31. Maria Cancian et al., Characteristics of Participants in the Child Sup-
port Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED) Evalua-
tion 35 (2018); Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their 
Child Support: 2015 12 (2020); Maureen R. Waller, Allison D. Emory & Elise 
Paul, Money, Time, or Something Else?  Measuring Noncustodial Fathers’ Infor-
mal and In-Kind Contributions, 39 J. of Fam. Issues 3612, 3613 (2018); Jennifer 
B. Kane, Timothy J. Nelson & Kathryn Edin, How Much In-Kind Support Do 
Low-Income Nonresident Fathers Provide?  A Mixed-Method Analysis, 77 J. of 
Marriage & Fam 591, 593–94 (2015); Virginia Knox & Cindy Redcross, Parent-
ing and Providing: The Impact of Parents’ Fair Share on Paternal Involve-
ment, Manpower Demonstration Res. Corp. 48, 53 (2000); Lenna Nepom-
nyaschy, Child Support and Father-Child Contact: Testing Reciprocal Pathways, 
44 Demography 93, 106–08 (2007).
32. Maureen R. Waller., My Baby’s Father: Unmarried Parents and Paternal 
Responsibility  (2002); David J. Pate, Jr., An Ethnographic Inquiry into the Life 
Experiences of African American Fathers with Children on W-2, in Fathers of 
Children in W-2 Families, W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation of 
Nonexperimental Analyses, Vol. II 79 (Daniel R. Meyer & Maria Cancian eds., 
2002).
33. Turner v. Rogers, supra note 2, at 449 (“We do not address civil contempt pro-
ceedings where the underlying child support payment is owed to the State, for 
example, for reimbursement of welfare funds paid to the parent with custo-
dy . . .  Those proceedings more closely resemble debt-collection proceedings.”).
34. Off. of Child Support Enf’t,  supra note 16, at 7.  Colorado reports similar pre-
liminary results following implementation of its new law to pass through 100 
percent of ongoing monthly payments to families receiving TANF. Michael Mar-
tinez-Schiferl, Poster Paper: Effects of Child Support Full Pass Through on Colo-
rado Families in Need, Presentation at the Association for Public Policy Analysis 
and Management 41st Annual Fall Research Conference (Nov. 7, 2019), https://
appam.confex.com/appam/2019/webprogram/Paper30963.html [https://perma.
cc/XM57-CZ2M].
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while the federal share is sent to the federal treasury.  Evidence from 
policy experiments in Wisconsin and Washington DC which passed 
through the child support payments to families receiving TANF found 
that nonresident parents were more likely to pay formal child support 
and resident parents received more support.35
Although state cost recovery policies vary, states overall keep two-
thirds of the support collected for children receiving cash assistance.  Even 
after families leave TANF, states continue to withhold a share of their 
child support payments to pay back cash assistance costs.  These payments 
made for families who no longer receive TANF represent 60 percent of 
the total cost recovery dollars.  It is important to note that more than half 
of child support program cases involve families who never received cash 
assistance and are not subject to assignment rules.   From these families, 
however, states collect service fees and costs.  Some states also pursue 
reimbursement of Medicaid costs, although the amount is not separately 
reported.  A few seek Medicaid reimbursement of childbirth costs, hugely 
adding to the debt burden of low-income nonresident parents.36
Over the past four decades, the mission of the child support pro-
gram has steadily evolved, and the program has become an important 
family support and antipoverty program.37  Welfare cost recovery now 
plays a more limited role and contributes far less revenue to the state 
budget than in the past.38  Currently, one-fifth of child support arrears 
are owed to the government, down from one-half in 2002.39  Two federal 
policy changes have reduced the cost-recovery role of the child sup-
port program.  First, TANF caseloads have declined steeply following 
35. Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer & Emma Caspar, Welfare and Child Support: 
Complements, Not Substitutes, 27 J. of Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 354, 354 (2008); 
Kye Lippold, Austin Nichols & Elaine Sorensen, Evaluation of the $150 
Child Support Pass-Through and Disregard Policy in the District of Co-
lumbia 46 (2010).
36. All child support orders must provide for child health care coverage, whether 
through private or public insurance or public coverage through Medicaid and 
CHIP.  Some states also order medical child support to reimburse specific medi-
cal bills not covered by insurance.  A small number of states seek orders to reim-
burse Medicaid for birthing costs.  Courts order medical support payments sep-
arately from regular child support payments, and medical support is accounted 
for separately.  Administrative data aggregate $543 million in medical support 
payments to reimburse custodial parents and those redirected to the Medicaid 
agency.  See Off. of Child Support Enf’t, supra note 16, at 7.
37. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., National 
Child Support Strategic Plan for 2015–2019 1 (2016); Vicki Turetsky, In 
Everybody’s Best Interests: Why Reforming Child Support Distribution 
Makes Sense for Government and Families 7 (2005).
38. Twenty-five years ago, states kept almost three times as much child support as they 
do today.  In 1996, states held back 24 percent of total collections, or $2.9 billion. 
See Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., FY 1996 
Annual Report to Congress: Office of Child Support Enforcement (1996).
39. Dennis Putze, Who Owes the Child Support Debt? 2 (2017); Off. of Child 
Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Major Changes in Who is 
Owed Child Support Arrears 1 (2014).
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implementation of the 1996 federal welfare reform law.  Second, federal 
laws enacted over the past two decades have prioritized support pay-
ments to families over welfare cost recovery.40  Since 2006, states have 
had the flexibility to pay 100 percent of all collected support payments 
to families.  All states have substantially reduced cost recovery, but all 
continue to keep some collected support to reimburse cash assistance.41
Even as welfare cost recovery has begun to recede, however, legal 
financial obligations generated by the criminal justice system have grown 
to claim the limited resources of poor fathers and their families, compet-
ing with support payments for children and exhausting family resources.42 
Legal financial obligations both compound and crowd out child support 
payments.  Although federal policy has prioritized payment of child sup-
port over other kinds of public debt such as student loans, states have not 
necessarily done so.43  Consequently, poor fathers are forced to prioritize 
whichever payments will keep them out of jail.
II. Child Support Debt as a Collateral Consequence 
of Incarceration
Child support caseloads include a significant number of parents 
who are incarcerated or have a history of incarceration.44  Parents who 
have been incarcerated accrue almost three times
as much in arrears as those who were never in prison by the time 
their children are age 15.45  In 2005, the Council of State Governments 
specifically identified child support debt as a collateral civil consequence 
of incarceration.46
40. The 2006 federal law curtailed the scope of support assignment and gave states 
several options to pay more or all of collected support to current and former 
TANF families.  See Paul Legler & Vicki Turetsky, More Child Support Dol-
lars to Kids: Using New State Flexibility in Child Support Pass-Through 
and Distribution Rules to Benefit Government and Families 1 (2006).
41. National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) tracks state implementation 
of TANF pass-through options, but not other family payment options adopted 
by states.  Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Child Support Pass-Through and 
Disregard Policies for Public Assistance Recipients (July 18, 2017), https://www.
ncsl.org/research/human-services/state-policy-pass-through-disregard-child-
support.aspx [https://perma.cc/82L5-U6UA].
42. Jennifer L. Noyes et al., Final Implementation Findings from the Child Sup-
port Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED) Evalua-
tion 91 (2018).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 6402(c) (2019); 42 U.S.C. 664(a) (2014).
44. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, supra note 3, at 2.
45. Allison D. Emory, Lenna Nepomnyaschy, Maureen R. Waller, Daniel P. Miller 
& Alexandra Haralampoudis, Providing After Prison: Nonresident Fathers’ For-
mal and Informal Contributions to Children, Russell Sage Found. J. of Soc. Sci. 
(2020).
46. See Council of State Governments, Report of the Re-Entry Policy Council: 
Charting the Safe and Successful Return of Prisoners to the Community 
(2005) (citing child support debt as a collateral civil consequence of incarcera-
tion in policy statements 8, 13, 18, 23, 34).
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Research from the Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employ-
ment Demonstration (CSPED), found that two-thirds of demonstration 
participants reported a history of incarceration in jail or prison.  CSPED, 
a largescale demonstration funded by the federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE) and conducted in eight states, involved more than 
10,000 nonresident parents participating in the child support program. 
Only 56 percent of participants had worked in the thirty days prior to 
enrollment.  Among those who had worked in the past thirty days, their 
median monthly earnings were $500, while their median child support 
order was $325 per month.  For 58 percent of employed participants, child 
support order amounts represented more than half of their earnings.47
When parents go to prison, many do not realize that their child sup-
port continues to accrue even though they lack any ability to pay it.  Most 
incarcerated parents have little or no income and do not have any real-
istic ability to pay child support while in prison.  Even on work release, 
earnings are usually small and barely cover basic needs in prison.48
Under federal law, parents facing a substantial drop in income may 
seek a review and adjustment (also called modification) of their child 
support orders.49  Timely modification is important to prevent the accu-
mulation of overwhelming debt during incarceration, especially because 
federal law prohibits courts from retroactively modifying child support 
orders once they are established.50  However, in most states, support or-
ders are not automatically suspended when parents go to prison.  Instead, 
incarcerated parents must initiate a review and adjustment of their orders.
Many incarcerated parents do not understand the child support 
process or their rights to request review and adjustment of their child 
support orders and cannot easily contact the child support office.  Be-
cause incarcerated parents are involuntarily confined, their access to 
the Internet or cell phones is often restricted due to security concerns. 
They may not have access to legal counsel or other community-based 
resources that could provide timely information.  Consequently, their op-
portunity to seek information and request a review in time to prevent the 
accumulation of debts often is limited or nonexistent.51
47. Cancian et al., supra note 31, at xi.
48. Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ Accumu-
lation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. 
& Pol’y 187, 189 (2007); Pamela Ovwigho, Correne Saunders & Catherine E. 
Born, The Intersection of Incarceration & Child Support: A Snapshot of 
Maryland’s Caseload 9–11 (2005).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(10) (2018).
50. The Bradley Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-509, 100 Stat. 1904 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C § 666(a)(9)(c) (2018)). See Vicki Turetsky, Realistic Child Sup-
port Policies For Low Income Fathers 8 (2000).
51. See Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Changing 
a Child Support Order 2 (2014); Jennifer L. Noyes, Maria Cancian & Lau-
ra Cuesta, Holding Child Support Orders of Incarcerated Payers in Abey-
ance: Final Evaluation Report 2 (2012).
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Two decades ago, half of states treated incarceration as “voluntary 
unemployment,” a legal doctrine barring incarcerated parents from seek-
ing a modification of their child support orders.  Since then, nearly all 
of these states have eliminated laws treating incarceration as voluntary 
unemployment.52  As discussed below, recent federal rules prohibit states 
from treating incarceration as “voluntary unemployment” that legally 
bars incarcerated parents from requesting a modification of their orders, 
but several states are still in the process of implementing these rules.53 
Moreover, unless states take action to automatically suspend child sup-
port orders during incarceration, most debt will accrue unabated.
Employment and family support are critical for successful reinte-
gration into the community following prison.54  However, child support 
debt can take a large personal toll, with implications for employment, 
health, family life, and civic participation.  In federal surveys, homeless 
veterans reported that child support debt was one of their top legal 
problems.55  In qualitative studies, disadvantaged men report significant 
challenges complying with child support orders when they lack stable 
employment and convey a sense of hopelessness about their ability to 
pay off their arrears.  They are particularly discouraged about accruing 
high debts while they are unemployed, incarcerated, or supporting their 
children informally, and about experiencing enforcement practices such 
as incarceration that can further undermine their employment and abili-
ty to provide for their children.56
There is mounting quantitative evidence that high arrears substan-
tially reduce child support payments, labor force participation, earnings, 
credit scores, and stable housing by nonresident parents.57  Upon release, 
52. Author’s review of recent state child support guidelines amendments.  See Off. 
of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., “Voluntary Un-
employment,” Imputed Income, and Modification: Laws and Policies for In-
carcerated Noncustodial Parents (2012); Jessica Pearson, Building Debt 
While Doing Time: Child Support and Incarceration, 43 Judges J. 5, 5–6 (2004).
53. Flexibility, Efficiency and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Pro-
grams, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,492, 93,521 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
301–309).
54. Christy A. Visher & Shannon M.E. Courtney, Cleveland Prisoners’ Experi-
ence Returning Home 2 (2006).
55. Off. of Pub. Aff., U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Aff., Community Homelessness As-
sessment, Local Education and Networking Groups (CHALENG) 2 (2019).
56. Waller, supra note 32; Maureen R. Waller & Robert Plotnick, Effective Child 
Support Policy for Low-Income Families: Evidence from Street Level Research, 
20 J. of Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 89, 93 (2001); David J. Pate, Jr., An Ethnograph-
ic Inquiry into the Life Experiences of African American Fathers with Children 
on W-2, in Fathers of Children in W-2 Families, W-2 Child Support Demon-
stration Evaluation of Nonexperimental Analyses, Vol. II 79 (Daniel R. 
Meyer & Maria Cancian eds., 2002); Lynne Haney, Incarcerated Fatherhood: The 
Entanglements of Child Support Debt and Mass Imprisonment, 124 Am. J. Soc. 1, 
39–41 (2018).
57. Turner & Waller, supra note 18, at 24–25; Daniel P. Miller & Ronald B. Min-
cy, Falling Further Behind?  Child Support Arrears and Father’s Labor Force 
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incarceration typically results in a decline in employability and earnings 
potential, and parents returning to the community often struggle to find 
employment and pay their child support orders.  Parents with a history 
of incarceration earn lower wages, have higher child support debts, and 
pay a smaller share of their child support orders than those who were not 
incarcerated.58
Parents who owe large child support debts are more likely to be-
come discouraged and leave formal employment, further compromising 
their ability to support their children.  This is partly because up to 65 
percent of disposable income can be withheld from the paychecks of 
nonresident parents owing arrears under the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act.59  This high withholding rate can have the unintended effect of 
pushing low-wage parents out of a job, because the remaining paycheck 
is often too little to survive on.60  Child support debt can lead to increased 
job-hopping, participation in the underground economy, and generation 
of illegal income as parents try to support themselves and their children 
and avoid the child support program.61
Indebtedness can exacerbate family hardship and tensions, driving 
a wedge between the parents and pushing nonresident parents away from 
their children.62  Child support debt that exceeds a nonresident parent’s 
ability to pay can increase friction between the parents and unrealisti-
cally inflate resident parent expectations of payment.63  Child support 
debt can also create a barrier to parent involvement.  There is evidence 
that indebted fathers have significantly less contact with their children, 
Participation, 86 Soc. Serv. Rev. 604, 604–05 (2012); Maria Cancian, Carolyn 
Heinrich & Yiyoon Chung, Does Debt Discourage Employment and Payment of 
Child Support?  Evidence from a Natural Experiment 3–5 (Inst. for Res. on Pov-
erty, Working Paper No. 2009-012, 2009); Harry J. Holzer, Paul Offner & Elaine 
Sorensen, Declining Employment Among Young Black Less-Educated Men: The 
Role of Incarceration and Child Support, 24 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 329, 346–
47 (2004).
58. Carl Formoso & Qinghua Liu, Arrears Stratification in Washington State: 
Developing Operational Protocols in a Data Mining Environment 35 
(2010); Pew Charitable Tr., Collateral Costs: Incarceration’s Effect on 
Economic Mobility 9–17 (2010).
59. Under federal law, states have the discretion to withhold a lower amount. 15 
U.S.C. §  1673(b)(3) (2018); see Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Serv., Income Withholding for Child Support: Techniques 
for Effective Management of Program Operations (2007).
60. Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 48, at 191.
61. Turetsky, supra note 5, at 3–4.
62. Karin Martinson & Demetra Nightingale, Ten Key Findings from Respon-
sible Fatherhood Initiatives 1 (2008); Judi Bartfeld, Forgiveness of State-
Owed Child Support Arrears 12 (2003).
63. Maureen R.  Waller & Robert Plotnick, Effective Child Support Policy for 
Low-Income Families: Evidence from Street Level Research, 20 J. of Pol’y Anal-
ysis & Mgmt. 89, 99 (2001).
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are less engaged in their daily activities, and provide less frequent infor-
mal support.64
Nonresident parents with child support arrears also report more 
depression and problematic alcohol use.65  Research from the federal 
CSPED demonstration suggests that as many as one-quarter of low-in-
come parents who owe child support and participate in employment 
programs suffer from major depression.66  In addition, other research 
shows that “unsecured debt,” such as credit card debt and medical debt, is 
associated with lower socioemotional wellbeing for children.67  Data from 
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health indicates that 
high debt relative to resources is also a significant independent predictor 
of negative health outcomes such as depression and anxiety, suicidal ide-
ation, obesity, substance use, and cardiovascular diseases.68  Behavioral 
science research further finds that financial stress reduces capacity for 
good decisionmaking and problemsolving.69  Unlike some other forms of 
debt, child support arrears can create lifelong indebtedness, even after 
the obligor’s children are grown and have children of their own.
III. Why is Child Support Debt so High?
Child support debt is both “a cause and a consequence” of non-
compliance with child support orders.70  A 2017 OCSE analysis of child 
support program cases found that most unpaid child support arrears are 
owed by nonresident parents with reported incomes below $10,000 per 
year.71  This finding is consistent with a landmark study of child support 
arrears in nine large states conducted in 2007 by the Urban Institute, 
which found that nonresident parents with reported income of $10,000 
or less owed 70 percent of the debt.
The best predictor of compliance with a child support order is a 
nonresident parent’s monthly gross earnings.72  Parents who meet their 
current support obligations are more likely to be employed and have sig-
nificantly higher earnings.  By contrast, nearly all parents who fall behind 
64. Turner & Waller, supra note 18, at 26.
65. Hyunjoon Um, The Role of Child Support Debt on the Development of Men-
tal Health Problems among Noncustodial Fathers 13–14 (Colum. Univ. Sch. Soc. 
Sci., Working Paper No.19-05-FF, 2019); Turner & Waller, supra note 18, at 27.
66. Cancian et al., supra note 31, at 17.
67. Lawrence M. Berger & Jason N. Houle, Parental Debt and Children’s Socio-
emotional Well-being, 137 Pediatrics 1, 1–2 (2016).
68. Elizabeth Sweet et al., The High Price of Debt: Household Financial Debt and Its 
Impact on Mental and Physical Health, 91 Soc. Sci. Med. 94, 95 (2013).
69. Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Scarcity: The New Science of Hav-
ing Less and How it Defines our Lives (2013).
70. Maria Cancian, Carolyn J. Heinrich & Yiyoon Chung, Discouraging Disadvan-
taged Fathers’ Employment: An Unintended Consequence of Policies Designed to 
Support Families, 32 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 758, 760 (2013).
71. Putze, supra note 39, at 3 (2017).
72. Mark Takayesu, How Do Child Support Order Amounts Affect Payments 
and Compliance? 14 (2011).
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on child support payments have unstable employment and low earnings, 
and a significant number have a history of incarceration.73  For example, 
90 percent of Wisconsin nonresident parents who made no payment and 
60 percent making partial payment were incarcerated or did not have 
year-round employment.74
The amount of the order compared to actual income also strong-
ly predicts payment, especially for parents with the lowest incomes.75  A 
growing body of research has found that compliance declines at all income 
levels when monthly support order amounts are set higher than about 20 
percent of the nonresident parent’s actual gross earnings.76  Lower-earn-
ing parents are expected to pay a much higher share of their incomes 
toward child support.  For example, parents who earn a $50,000 median 
income in Maryland are ordered to pay 14 percent of their earnings as 
child support, while parents earning a $6000 median income are ordered 
to pay 61 percent.77  Charging interest, fees and costs for paternity testing, 
case processing, and court costs, calculating child support retroactively 
to the child’s birth, and seeking Medicaid reimbursement for childbirth 
costs all contribute to unrealistically high child support orders and result 
in a debt balance as soon as the order is established.78
In many states, low-income parents are routinely issued standard 
minimum wage orders.  These orders are based on imputed, or assumed, 
income rather than a factual determination of a specific parent’s income 
and ability to pay.  Courts often impute income when nonresident par-
ents are unemployed, employed part-time, or fail to come to court, or 
when income documentation is missing.  Imputed income exaggerates 
actual earnings.  In one Maryland study, parents with orders based on 
imputed income actually earned 72 percent less than the amount listed 
on the child support worksheets.79
73. Yoonsook Ha et al., Factors Associated with Nonpayment of Child Support 
10–14 (2008); Letitia Logan Passarella, Maryland’s Child Support Case-
load: Examining Obligors Who owed Support in July 2017 3 (2018).
74. Ha et al., supra note 73, at 15.
75. Judi Bartfeld, Forgiveness of State-Owed Child Support Arrears 8 (2003); 
Takayesu, supra note 72, at 40.
76. Natalie Demyan & Letitia Logan Passarella, Actual Earnings and Payment 
Outcomes Among Obligors with Imputed Income 10 (2018); Formoso & Liu, 
supra note 58, at 8; Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., 
Child Support for Children on TANF 10 (2002); Takayesu, supra note 72, at 
27.
77. Letitia Logan Passarella, Maryland Snapshot of Noncustodial Parents: Examin-
ing Who Owed Support in July 2017,  Univ. Maryland Sch. Soc. Work (2018).
78. 42 U.S.C. §  654(6) (2019); see also Vicki Turetsky, Realistic Child Support 
Policies For Low Income Fathers 7 (2000).
79. Demyan & Passarella, supra note 76, at 1; See also Robert D. Plotnick & Alec I. 
Kennedy, How Accurate are Imputed Child Support Orders? 88 Child. & Youth 
Serv. Rev. 490, 490 (2018) (finding that imputation did not match actual earn-
ings, resulting in orders that are too high or too low for the majority of nonresi-
dent fathers in Washington study).
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Cases with imputed income at the minimum wage pay at a lower 
compliance rate, accumulate higher debts, and collect fewer dollars than 
when an order is set based on a lower amount.80  As the Office of In-
spector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
concluded two decades ago, “Income imputation appears ineffective in 
generating payments.”81
In many jurisdictions, the routine use of income imputation when 
parents are low-income has created a two-tiered legal system.  In high-
er earning cases, income is imputed sparingly and only when there is a 
sufficient evidentiary foundation to establish that nonresident parents 
have deliberately reduced their earnings or where the facts show a dis-
crepancy between reported income and lifestyle.  The burden of proof is 
typically placed on the party seeking imputation.  By contrast, income 
is assumed as “potential income” without further evidence when non-
resident parents have limited education, few marketable job skills, and 
low or no earnings.  The burden of proof is on low-earning nonresident 
parents to establish that they are unable to secure fulltime employment. 
This outcome does not reflect the realities of the labor market for poor, 
less educated parents, particularly young African American men—few 
fulltime jobs, unstable part-time work often located far from the neigh-
borhood, racial discrimination, and high incarceration rates.82
IV. Child Support Enforcement and Inability to Pay
Seventy percent of child support payments are collected through 
payroll deductions, like taxes.  However, for those nonresident parents 
who are not employed fulltime with a paycheck that is sufficient to sat-
isfy their child support obligations, failure to pay child support can lead 
to a host of legal consequences, including criminal and administrative 
penalties, such as driver’s license suspension, revocation of profession-
al, occupational and recreational licenses, passport revocation, seizure of 
financial accounts, property liens, interception of tax refunds and gov-
ernment payments such as Social Security and unemployment insurance 
benefits, and negative credit reporting.83
80. The University of Maryland found that the collection rate for imputed minimum 
wage orders is 10 percentage points lower than orders based on actual income 
in low-income cases, while the California study found that the most likely out-
come of minimum wage orders was zero payments during the year following or-
der establishment.  Demyan & Passarella, supra note 76, at 10; see also Mark 
Takayesu, Understanding Payment Barriers to Improve Child Support Com-
pliance 4 (2013).
81. Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., The Establishment 
of Child Support Orders for Low Income Non-custodial Parents 3 (2000).
82. See Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a Low-
Wage Market: A Field Experiment, 74 Am. Soc. Rev. 777, 777–80 (2009).
83. Carmen Solomon-Fears, Alison M. Smith & Carla Berry, Child Support En-
forcement: Incarceration As the Last Resort Penalty for Nonpayment of 
Support 2 (2012).
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The interaction between the criminal justice system and the child 
support system is relevant both for nonresident parents with open child 
support orders during incarceration, and for those parents who are in-
carcerated for noncompliance with their child support orders.84  Most 
incarcerated parents who accumulate child support debt are in prison or 
jail for reasons that are unrelated to child support enforcement.  In these 
cases, the policy focus is on preventing and reducing the accumulation of 
uncollectible arrears during prison.
However, parents can also be incarcerated for failure to pay child 
support.  Parents typically face civil contempt charges and serve time in 
a jail rather than prison.  Less commonly, parents can be prosecuted for 
criminal nonsupport or jailed for criminal contempt.85  In addition, stay-
ing current on child support payments is sometimes made a condition of 
parole, and failure to pay is treated as a parole violation that can send 
a parent back to jail.  Limited information is available about the preva-
lence or cost of using incarceration as a child support enforcement tool, 
although it is widely believed to not be cost-effective.86
A civil contempt proceeding is intended to be coercive and condi-
tional, while the purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is punitive. 
However, the key distinction is that nonresident parents are constitution-
ally entitled to counsel and other enhanced due process safeguards in a 
criminal contempt proceeding, but not for civil contempt.  A finding of 
civil contempt for failure to pay support typically requires that a defen-
dant has been ordered to pay child support, has the ability to comply with 
the order, and failed to do so.  A defendant is said to “carr[y] the keys of 
his prison in his own pockets” by paying the “purge amount” set by the 
court,87 which is a payment toward arrears required by the court to avoid 
being jailed on contempt charges.
Child support civil contempt practices vary considerably from state 
to state.  For example, some state child support agencies rarely, if ever, 
bring civil contempt actions.  Other state agencies routinely use show 
cause or contempt proceedings to elicit information from the nonresi-
dent parent or to order a parent to seek work or go into employment or 
substance abuse programs, but jail is not a typical outcome.  Some states 
also provide for legal counsel in a civil contempt action when it can lead 
to incarceration.88
84. Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, Child Support and Incarceration (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and- incarceration.
aspx [https://perma.cc/B3HV-CRC8].
85. The Deadbeat Parent Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1998) (making it a federal crime to 
intentionally evade payment by traveling across state lines if support has re-
mained unpaid for more than one year or is greater than $5,000); see Solo-
mon-Fears, Smith & Berry, supra note 83, at 12.
86. Solomon-Fears, Smith & Berry, supra note 83, at 12.
87. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Turner v. 
Rogers Guidance 7–8 (2012).
88. Id. at 3.
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When parents fall behind on their child support payments, poorly 
targeted and overly aggressive enforcement can make it even harder for 
them to stay employed, keep up with their current support payments, 
and stay out of jail.  There is no evidence that incarceration results in 
more reliable child support payments when the issue is inability to pay. 
Rather, incarceration can result in the accumulation of additional child 
support debt, and has the potential to reduce future earnings, erode a 
child’s relationship with his or her parent, and negatively impact family 
and community stability.
A. Civil Contempt and the Turner v. Rogers Decision
In June 2011, the U. S. Supreme Court decided the case of Turner 
v. Rogers.89  The question in Turner was whether the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires states to 
provide legal counsel to an indigent person at a child support civil con-
tempt hearing that could lead to incarceration in circumstances where the 
resident parent or opposing party was not represented by legal counsel.
In 2003, Mr. Turner, the nonresident parent, was $5,700 behind 
in child support payments.  He was held in civil contempt for nonpay-
ment on five occasions and was incarcerated several times, including a 
twelve-month jail term in 2008.  In South Carolina, unlike other states, 
the family court clerk automatically initiates a civil contempt hearing 
without involvement of the child support program or private attorneys 
for the parties.  At the hearing, Mr. Turner was not represented by coun-
sel, nor was a state child support attorney or counsel for the resident 
parent involved.
The trial court ordered that Mr. Turner be jailed without making 
any findings on the record regarding Mr. Turner’s ability to pay the purge 
amount.  The court set the entire child support arrears balance as the 
purge amount.  Mr. Turner subsequently appealed, alleging that his rights 
were violated because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment required the state to provide him with appointed counsel in a civil 
contempt hearing that could lead to incarceration.
The Court held that the state violated Mr. Turner’s due process 
rights.  The Turner Court also suggested that an express finding may be 
constitutionally required that the nonresident parent has the actual and 
present ability to comply with the court’s purge order.  In other words, 
the defendant must carry “the keys of his prison in his own pockets,” 
whether it is satisfying a purge payment, participating in an employment 
or substance abuse treatment program, or other required actions.
However, the Turner Court held that a state does not need to au-
tomatically provide counsel to an unrepresented defendant in a child 
support civil contempt proceeding, under the specific facts of the case, if 
the state has “in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally 
fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether 
89. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011).
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the supporting parent is able to comply with the court order.”  The Court 
specifically left unresolved the question of what due process protections 
may be required where: (1) the other parent or the state is represented 
by an attorney; (2) the unpaid arrears are owed to the state under an 
assignment of child support rights; or, (3) the case is unusually complex.
Pro se litigants in child support program cases—that is, parents 
without legal representation—are often low-income, have little under-
standing of child support laws, and have difficulty navigating the court 
process.90  Most of the time, neither parent in a child support case has 
a lawyer to represent them in court.  Agency lawyers do not represent 
either parent.  Instead, they represent the state’s interest in obtaining 
financial support for children so that they are adequately cared for and 
have less need for public assistance.  For parents, the legal consequenc-
es of going to court without a lawyer to represent their interests can be 
serious.  Procedural justice research finds that nonresident parents are 
more likely to comply with child support obligations when they perceive 
that the proceedings have been fair, they have been able to explain their 
circumstances and to be heard, and they have been treated respectfully.91
In 2012, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement issued 
guidance to state child support agencies implementing the Turner deci-
sion, requiring them to screen cases for ability to pay before pursuing civil 
contempt.92  These program requirements were incorporated into feder-
al rules published in 2016, discussed below.  Although many advocates 
saw the Turner decision as a loss for nonresident parents facing jail time, 
post-Turner ability to pay screening policies have had a significant impact 
on reducing state use of civil contempt procedures to enforce child sup-
port.93  The Turner decision case caused states to reevaluate whether civil 
contempt and the threat of jail is the most effective approach to collect-
ing child support.   The decision also prompted consideration of how to 
best implement access to justice and procedural justice principles in child 
support proceedings.94
90. Bartfeld, supra note 75, at 10.
91. Tom R. Tyler, Court Review—Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 J. Am. Judg-
es Ass’n 26, 26 (2007); I-Fen Lin, Perceived Fairness and Compliance with Child 
Support Obligations, 62 J. Marriage & Fam. 388, 396-97 (2000); see also Modi-
fication to Funding Opp. Announcement HHS-2016-ACF-OCSE-FD-1172, Off. 
of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Procedural Justice 
Informed Alternatives to Contempt (PJAC) 5 (July 8, 2016).
92. Information Memorandum IM-12-01 from Vicki Turetsky, Commissioner, Off. 
of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv. to State Agencies 
Administering Child Support Enf’t Plans under Title IV-D of the Social Securi-
ty Act and Other Interested Parties (June 18, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/
resource/alternatives-to-incarceration [https://perma.cc/D3HP-6JMJ]; Off. of 
Child Support Enf’t, supra note 87.
93. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Patterson, Turner in the Trenches: A Study of How Turner 
v. Rogers Affected Child Support Contempt Proceedings, 25 Geo. J. on Poverty 
L. & Pol’y 75, 88 (2017).
94. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, supra note 37, at 12.
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B. Driver’s License Suspensions to Enforce Child Support
Federal law requires states to use driver’s license suspension as a 
tool to enforce child support arrears “in appropriate cases,” but gives 
states the discretion within constitutional limits on how to implement 
this.95  When parents cannot afford to pay all of their child support, 
driver’s license suspension carries serious ramifications for parents, em-
ployers, and families, raising potential due process concerns.96
Data show that driver’s license suspensions affect the poor to a much 
greater extent than other income groups.  Having a suspended driver’s li-
cense reduces the ability of already economically destabilized parents to 
work, pay child support, and maintain parent-child relationships, all key 
goals of the child support program.  Driver’s license suspension can set 
up a vicious cycle, making it harder to pay child support than before the 
suspension.97
The U.S. Census found that three-fourths of American workers reg-
ularly drive to work, underscoring the importance of driving in everyday 
life.98  Driver’s license suspensions threaten the ability of nonresident 
parents to earn a livelihood and can lead to job loss or the inability to 
look for a job.99  Even a short suspension could cause a parent to lose a 
job or job opportunity.  Research indicates that available jobs may be far 
away from home and out of reach of public transportation.  Greater “job 
sprawl” is particularly associated with higher spatial mismatch for Afri-
can American workers, who can be more geographically isolated from 
jobs.  Further, a driver’s license is a requirement for some jobs, such as a 
delivery person or truck driver.  Some employers also use a valid driver’s 
license as a condition of employment.100
Driver’s license suspensions also can make matters worse by inter-
fering with family responsibilities.101  Nonresident parents may not be able 
to drive to see their children, pick them up from school or childcare, attend 
school conferences, or take them to the doctor.  Not being able to drive 
95. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) (2014); see Carmen Solomon-Fears, Child Support En-
forcement and Driver’s License Suspension Policies 4–5 (2011).
96. See, e.g., Kavadas v. Martinez, No. MER-L-1004-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 
7, 2018); State Dep’t of Revenue v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725, 729 (Alaska 1998).
97. Alan M. Voorhees, Motor Vehicles Affordability and Fairness Task Force 
Final Report 42 (2006).
98. U.S. Census Bureau, Commuting Characteristics by Sex: 2013 American 
Community Survey 1-Year Estimates 1 (2013).
99. A New Jersey report states that 42 percent of individuals who had their licens-
es suspended lost jobs as a result of the suspension, 45 percent of those who lost 
jobs could not find another job, and 88 percent of those that were able to find an-
other job reported a decrease in income.  Vorhees, supra note 97, at 38.
100. Michael A. Stoll, Job Sprawl and the Spatial Mismatch between Blacks 
and Jobs 2 (2005).
101. Lavanya Madhusudan, Job Opportunities Task Force, The Criminalization 
of Poverty: How to Break the Cycle through Policy Reform in Maryland 26 
(2018); Ronald B. Mincy & Elaine J. Sorensen, Deadbeats and Turnips in Child 
Support Reform, 17 J. of Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 44 (1998).
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also can mean that parents cannot help other dependent family members, 
taking them to doctor appointments, the grocery store, or church.
V. Policy Efforts to Mitigate the Causes and Consequences 
of Child Support Debt
At the same time that the role of cost recovery in child support pro-
gram has become less central, there has also been more recognition at the 
state and federal level that child support arrears may be uncollectable 
from nonresident fathers with very low incomes and may have unintend-
ed consequences for their families.  Over the last fifteen years, state child 
support agencies have begun to develop alternative family-centered and 
service-oriented strategies that prioritize the wellbeing of families and 
children over cost recovery and help poor, nonresident parents provide 
more consistent financial support for their children.  This evidence-based 
approach to obtaining child support payments offers a promising alterna-
tive to standard enforcement strategies.102
More than three-fourths of child support programs have debt com-
promise programs to reduce or eliminate state-owed child support debt, 
although some of these are pilot programs or operate on a case-by-case 
basis.103  Although evaluations are ongoing, some evidence suggests these 
programs improve low-income parents’ ability to pay ongoing child sup-
port.104  The Bradley Amendment, a 1986 federal amendment to title 
IV-D of the Social Security Act, establishes the basis for interstate en-
forcement by treating payments due under child support orders as state 
judgments entitled to full faith and credit and by prohibiting courts from 
retroactively modifying them.  However, under the longstanding feder-
al interpretation of the Bradley amendment, states have the authority 
to cancel child support debts owed to government as recovered wel-
fare costs.105  The right to cancel child support arrears owed to families 
102. Dan Bloom & Cindy Redcross, Demonstrated Results: Successful Collabora-
tions That Improve Outcomes in Prisoner Reentry and Child Support, 2018 Pol’y 
& Practice 20, 23; Jennifer L. Noyes, Lisa K. Vogel & Lanikque Howard, Cul-
ture Change: Implementing a New Approach to Child Support, 35 Focus 5, 15–17 
(2019); Vicki Turetsky, Llama, Llama, Child Support Under Obama, in Evidence 
Works: Cases Where Evidence Meaningfully Informed Policy 59–65 (Nick 
Hart & Meron Yohannes eds., 2019).
103. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., State Child 
Support Agencies With Debt Compromise Policies (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.acf.
hhs.gov/css/state-child-support-agencies-with-debt-compromise-policies-map 
[https://perma.cc/U9P8-VNK3]; Daniel R. Levinson, State Use of Debt Com-
promise to Reduce Child Support Arrearages i (2007).
104. Carolyn J. Heinrich, Brett C. Burkhardt & Hilary M. Shager, Reducing Child 
Support Debt and its Consequences: Can Forgiveness Benefit All?, 30 J. Pol’y 
Analysis & Mgmt. 755, 755–56 (2011).
105. 42 U.S.C. §  666(a)(9) (2014); Memorandum PIQ-00-03 from David G. Ross, 
Commissioner, Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., 
to State IV-D Directors, State IV-D Program Flexibility with Respect to Low In-
come Obligors (Sept. 14, 2000).
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belongs to resident parents, and states do not have authority to reduce 
those debts without the resident parents’ consent.
Many states have also designed strategies to help prevent low-in-
come parents from accruing unmanageable arrears, such as “right-sizing” 
support orders by curtailing the use of imputed income and eliminating 
interest, Medicaid birthing costs, and retroactive orders, and partnering 
with TANF or workforce agencies, courts, and community-based organi-
zations to provide employment and parenting services.106  It is increasingly 
common for state child support programs to match data with prisons and 
jails in order to identify incarcerated parents with child support orders. 
Child support agencies often provide educational sessions and individual 
case consultations in prisons that result in modifying child support orders 
and reducing state-owed arrears.  A limited number of states automati-
cally reduce support orders during incarceration, although most states 
require incarcerated parents to request a modification.
To spur adoption of these strategies and accelerate culture change 
within the child support program, OCSE has funded a number of larges-
cale demonstration and pilot projects in such areas as arrears reduction, 
alternatives to contempt, and employment services.107  Recent findings 
from the CSPED demonstration, which tested this new way of doing 
business, included substantially improved satisfaction with the child sup-
port program for nonresident parents and positive effects on earnings 
and parenting.108
In 2016, OCSE also adopted a set of research-informed adminis-
trative rules intended to reinforce this shift toward a family-centered 
approach to child support enforcement.109  The federal rules aim to 
106. Admin. for Child. & Fam., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., State Child 
Support Agencies with Programs to Ensure that Child Support Orders Reflect 
Current Earnings (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/archive/css/state-
child-support-agencies-programs-csorders-current-earnings [http://perma.
cc/7SHX-A3RF]; Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Serv., Work-Oriented Programs with Active Child Support Agency Involve-
ment that Serve Noncustodial Parents (July 1, 2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/
work-oriented-programs-for-noncustodial-parents-with-active-child-support 
[https://perma.cc/AME5-LCBJ].
107. See Bloom & Redcross, supra note 102; Caroline Mage, Peter Baird & Cynthia 
Miller, A New Response to Child Support Noncompliance: Introducing the 
Procedural Justice-Informed Alternatives to Contempt Project 1–2 (2019); 
Off. Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Addressing 
Child Support Needs of Homeless Veterans: HHS/VA/ABA Collabora-
tion (2017); Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., 
Building Assets for Fathers and Families (BAFF) Demonstration Grant 
(2016); Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., High-
lights from the CSPED Characteristics and Final Implementation Reports 
(2019); Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Les-
sons Learned from the BICS Demonstration Grants (2018).
108. Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer & Robert G. Wood, Can a Redesigned Child 
Support System Do Better?, 35 Focus 18 (2019).
109. Flexibility, Efficiency and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement 
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increase child support payments to children while reducing the accumu-
lation of uncollectible debt owed to the state in cases where the parents 
have low incomes.  Under the federal rules, states are required to imple-
ment a number of changes to existing state laws and procedures:
States must amend their child support guidelines to provide that 
child support orders are based on the parent’s “earnings, income, 
and other evidence of ability to pay.”110  Child support agencies have 
the responsibility to develop a sufficient factual basis for the support 
obligation.111
States must account for the parents’ subsistence needs in setting orders.112
States may not impute standardized amounts attributed to parents 
based on general assumptions about employability and income potential. 
Under the federal rules, states that authorize income imputation must 
take into consideration factual evidence of a nonresident parent’s specif-
ic circumstances.113
Programs, supra note 53; see Off. of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Serv., Final Rule Summary: Flexibility, Efficiency and Moderniza-
tion in Child Support Enforcement Programs (2017).
110. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(1) (2017) (providing that “The child support guidelines es-
tablished under paragraph (a) of this section must at a minimum: (1) Provide 
that the child support order is based on the noncustodial parent’s earnings, in-
come, and other evidence of ability to pay.”); See Off. of Child Support Enf’t, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Guidelines: Flexibility, Efficiency and 
Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs (2017).
111. 45 C.F.R. § 303.4(b) (requiring that state child support agencies, at a minimum, 
are: “(1) Taking reasonable steps to develop a sufficient factual basis for the sup-
port obligation, through such means as investigations, case conferencing, inter-
views with both parties, appear and disclose procedures, parent questionnaires, 
testimony, and electronic data sources; (2) Gathering information regarding the 
earnings and income of the noncustodial parent and, when earnings and income 
information is unavailable or insufficient in a case gathering available informa-
tion about the specific circumstances of the noncustodial parent, including such 
factors as those listed under § 302.56(c)(1)(iii) of this chapter; (3) Basing the 
support obligation or recommended support obligation amount on the earnings 
and income of the noncustodial parent whenever available.  If evidence of earn-
ings and income is unavailable or insufficient to use as the measure of the non-
custodial parent’s ability to pay, then the support obligation or recommended 
support obligation amount should be based on available information about the 
specific circumstances of the noncustodial parent, including such factors as those 
listed in § 302.56(c)(1)(iii) of this chapter. (4) Documenting the factual basis for 
the support obligation or the recommended support obligation in the case re-
cord.”).
112. 45 C.F.R. § 302.5(c)1)(ii) (providing that the state guidelines must provide that 
the support order “[t]akes into consideration the basic subsistence needs of the 
noncustodial parent (and at the State’s discretion, the custodial parent and chil-
dren) who has a limited ability to pay by incorporating a low-income adjust-
ment, such as a self-support reserve or some other method determined by the 
State.”).
113. 45 C.F.R § 302.56 (c)(iii) (providing that if imputation of income is authorized, 
the state guidelines provide that an order “takes into consideration the specific 
circumstances of the noncustodial parent (and at the State’s discretion, the cus-
todial parent) to the extent known, including such factors as the noncustodial 
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State guidelines are prohibited from treating incarceration as volun-
tary unemployment114 or excluding incarceration as a basis for modifying 
child support orders.115
States must provide notice to incarcerated parents who will be in-
carcerated for more than 180 days of their right to request a review of 
their orders.116  Alternatively, the federal rules permit states to modify the 
orders of incarcerated parents by operation of law and to automate the 
process for greater efficiency.117
States must establish guidelines for the use of civil contempt.  State 
child support agencies must screen cases for ability to pay, provide clear 
notice to parents that ability to pay is at issue, and provide the courts with 
factual information about the ability of nonresident parents to pay.118
parent’s assets, residence, employment and earnings history, job skills, education-
al attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record and other employment barri-
ers, and record of seeking work, as well as the local job market, the availability 
of employers willing to hire the noncustodial parent, prevailing earnings lev-
el in the local community, and other relevant background factors in the case.”).
114. 45 C.F.R § 302.56(c)(3) (stating that state child support guidelines must at a min-
imum: “Provide that incarceration may not be treated as voluntary unemploy-
ment in establishing or modifying support orders.”).
115. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(c) (2019) (providing that “[s]uch reasonable quantitative stan-
dard must not exclude incarceration as a basis for determining whether an in-
consistency between the existing child support order amount and the amount of 
support determined as a result of a review is adequate grounds for petitioning 
for adjustment of the order.”).
116. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(b)(2) (providing that “[t]he State may elect in its State plan to 
initiate review of an order, after learning that a noncustodial parent will be in-
carcerated for more than 180 calendar days, without the need for a specific re-
quest and, upon notice to both parents, review and, if appropriate, adjust the or-
der, in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.”;  45 C.F.R. § 303.8(b)
(7)(ii) (2019) provides that:  “The State must provide notice . . . .  If the State 
has not elected paragraph (b)(2) of this section, within 15 business days of when 
the IV-D agency learns that a noncustodial parent will be incarcerated for more 
than 180 calendar days, to both parents informing them of the right to request 
the State to review and, if appropriate, adjust the order, consistent with this sec-
tion.  The notice must specify, at a minimum, the place and manner in which the 
request should be made.  Neither the notice nor a review is required under this 
paragraph if the State has a comparable law or rule that modifies a child support 
obligation upon incarceration by operation of law.”).
117. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(b)(2) (providing that “[t]he State may elect in its State plan 
to initiate review of an order, after learning that a noncustodial parent will be 
incarcerated for more than 180 calendar days, without the need for a specif-
ic request and, upon notice to both parents, review and, if appropriate, adjust 
the order, in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.”); See Off. of 
Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Final Rule 
Fact Sheets: Modification for Incarcerated Parents (2017).
118. 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4) (providing for “[e]stablishing guidelines for the use of 
civil contempt citations in IV-D cases.  The guidelines must include require-
ments that the IV-D agency: (i) Screen the case for information regarding the 
noncustodial parent’s ability to pay or otherwise comply with the order; (ii) Pro-
vide the court with such information regarding the noncustodial parent’s ability 
to pay, or otherwise comply with the order, which may assist the court in making 
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States also have more federal funding available for pro se services 
and alternative dispute resolution, and transportation to child support 
appointments and hearings.119
States are in the process of implementing these rule provisions as 
part of their quadrennial child support guidelines review cycles, with im-
plementation to be completed by 2021.  Below, we highlight twelve policy 
recommendations to further help disadvantaged parents make consis-
tent child support payments, participate in the job market, and maintain 
family relationships.  These recommendations are particularly relevant 
for those parents who are at heightened risk for accruing unmanageable 
debts in both the child support and criminal justice systems.
VI. Twelve Recommendations
1.  States should get their child support programs completely out of 
the welfare cost recovery business by adopting the entire set of federal 
options to pay all collections to families.
2.  To comply with federal rules, state child support guidelines must 
specify that child support orders are based on the obligor’s “earnings, 
income and other evidence of ability to pay” and reserve enough money 
for low-income parents to provide for their basic subsistence needs.
3.  States should use available evidence of actual income as the basis 
of support orders even when parents have low incomes and must avoid 
the routine use of imputed income and standard minimum wage orders.
4.  States should be able to credit informal or in-kind child support 
payments agreed to between both parties when the nonresident parents’ 
earnings are limited, as is done in some tribal child support programs.
5.  States should stop charging interest on unpaid child support 
obligations.
6.  States should automatically reduce support orders of incarcer-
ated parents by operation of law, automate the process, and monitor 
support orders and payments upon release.  At minimum, they must 
provide notice of the right of incarcerated parents to seek a review and 
adjustment of their orders to comply with federal rules.
7.  States should automate criteria to identify and review cases with 
high default orders, standard minimum wage orders, and no payments, 
a factual determination regarding the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay the 
purge amount or comply with the purge conditions; and (iii) Provide clear no-
tice to the noncustodial parent that his or her ability to pay constitutes the crit-
ical question in the civil contempt action”);  See Off. of Child Support Enf’t, 
US Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Final Rule Fact Sheets: Civil Con-
tempt-Ensuring Noncustodial Parents Have the Ability to Pay (2017).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 304.20(b)(3) (providing that “[s]ervices and activities for which Fed-
eral financial participation will be available . . . (v) Bus fare or other minor trans-
portation expenses to enable custodial or noncustodial parties to participate in 
child support proceedings and related activities; (vi) Services to increase pro se 
access to adjudicative and alternative dispute resolution processes in IV-D cas-
es related to providing child support services”).
141Piling on Debt
and streamline and speed up the modification process, so that existing 
orders are adjusted to reflect current ability to pay and to prevent the 
buildup of arrears.
8.  States should set up automated criteria to identify the cases 
where uncollectible debt owed to the state can be reviewed and written 
off, and should adopt debt compromise programs to help disadvantaged 
parents manage their arrears.
9.  States should avoid the routine use of civil contempt procedures 
to enforce support orders.  To comply with federal rules, state child sup-
port agencies must screen cases for ability to pay before seeking civil 
contempt, provide the court with a factual basis of ability to pay, and 
provide appropriate notice to parents.
10.  States should stop suspending the driver’s licenses of low-in-
come parents for child support nonpayment.
11.  States should develop specialized outreach and case manage-
ment strategies for incarcerated and unemployed parents.
12.  States should implement nonresident parent employment and 
fathering programs, child support problemsolving courts, improved judi-
cial access for pro se litigants, and other effective family-centered services.
Conclusion
Outstanding child support debt has grown to $115 billion over the 
last forty years, and is largely uncollectible.  When that debt is owed to 
the government to repay cash assistance, it resembles other legal finan-
cial obligations and loses its character as support for children.  As TANF 
caseloads shrink, welfare cost recovery is becoming a less significant as-
pect of the child support program than in the past, and most child support 
debt is owed to families.  The accumulation of child support debt has 
major adverse effects on the ability of low-income nonresident parents 
to maintain employment and maintain relationships with their children. 
Much of the debt accumulates during periods of incarceration or un-
employment and is partly the result of state policies to impute fictional 
income to parents when they do not have earnings.  Overly aggressive 
and poorly targeted enforcement efforts—particularly civil contempt 
and driver’s license suspension—are often ineffective and have the effect 
of driving low-income nonresident parents out of jobs and into the un-
derground economy.  States are moving toward family-centered policies 
that address inability to pay through realistic support orders, state debt 
reduction, and employment and other services, instead of jail.

